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TEACHING CIVIL PROCEDURE WHILE YOU
WATCH IT DISINTEGRATE
Stephen N. Subrin*
The map of Europe, Northern Africa and the Arab nations
published in Monday's editions contained the following errors: Libya
was labeled as the Ukraine; Bulgaria and Romania were transposed;
Bosnia-Herzegovina was identified as Bosnia; Montenegro should
have been identified as a separate state bordering Serbia; Cyprus
and the West Bank were not labeled; Andorra, a country between
France and Spain, was not labeled; the Crimean Peninsula appeared
twice on the Black Sea; Kuwait was not identified by name, instead
the initials of the Knight-Ridder News Service were in its place.1
I. WHILE YOU WATCH IT DISINTEGRATE
So often these days we hear someone say: 'Mdy world is
falling apart, forcing me to question my assumptions and
threatening my sense of security." Is that what is happening to
civil procedure? Is my field really "disintegrating?" Weigh the
evidence.
A. The Changing Procedural Landscape
Most of us were introduced to civil procedure by the Feder-
al Rules. It is commonplace to point to their characteristic ease
of pleading and amendment, breadth of potential joinder of
parties and issues and liberal discovery. Also well documented
is their underlying philosophy: the importance of uniformity
Professor and Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, Northeastern University
School of Law; A.B., Harvard University 1958; LL.B., Harvard University 1963. As
always, I am indebted to my editor and friend, Judy Brown. I am also grateful to
the many students who have helped me, and especially to Mary Azzarito and Tom
Main.
No Comment Department, THE NEW YORKER, Feb. 22, 1993, at 182 (from the
Norfolk (Va.) Virginian-Pilot).
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from court to court and from case to case, and the twin virtues
of simplicity and flexibility. That the Federal Rules simulta-
neously offered lawyers procedural latitude and judges enor-
mous discretion is beyond realistic debate.2
Judicial discretion aside, this procedural world has now
largely collapsed. Since 1980, amendments to the Rules have
been predicated on an entirely new set of assumptions, what
Professor David Shapiro has called a "sea change."3 The 1983
amendments brought the new Rule 11, designed to force law-
yers to "stop and think" before filing documents, 4 provisions
designed to contract the scope of discovery,5 and the explicit
enlargement of the "subjects to be discussed at pretrial confer-
ences."
6
The new ideology emerged in 1976 at the Pound Confer-
ence, called to celebrate the seventieth anniversary of Roscoe
Pound's famous speech on the popular dissatisfaction with the
2 CHARLEs A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, CIVIL FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE §§ 1041-50 (2d ed. 1989) (cumulative effect of the civil rules). The
early amendments followed the same assumptions as the original Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure ("Federal Rules") and carried them further. Consider, for example,
the 1948 amendments eliminating the bill of particulars, and the expansion of the
compulsory counterclaim and cross-claim rules the same year. FED. R. C1V. P.
12(e), 13(a), 13(g). In 1966, an amendment to Rule 14 permitted early impleaders
without leave of court. FED. R. CIV. P. 14. The new class action rule the same
year made the device less rigid and more accessible. FED. R. CIV. P. 23. In 1970,
insurance agreements were explicitly added to the types of non-admissible evidence
that one could discover. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2). In the same year, Rule 34 was
amended to add production of documents to the means of discovery in which law-
yers could engage without obtaining permission of the court. FED. R. CiV. P. 34(a).
' David L. Shapiro, Federal Rule 16: A Look At the Theory and Practice of
Rulemaking, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1969, 1983 (1989). Professor Shapiro was
speaking primarily of the 1983 amendments to Rule 16, and the movement to-
wards managerial judging. Concern about discovery abuse already had been mani-
fested in 1980 when "widespread criticism of abuse of discovery" was sufficiently
intense to result in the addition of the Rule 26(f) discovery conference. FED. R.
CIV. P. 26(f) (Advisory Committee's Note to 1980 amendment). But the Advisory
Committee believed that "abuse of discovery, while very serious in certain cases, is
not so general as to require such basic changes in the rules that govern discovery
in all cases." FED. R. CIv. P. 26(f) (Advisory Committee's Note to 1980 amend-
ment). Justice Powell, joined by Justices Stewart and Rehnquist, dissented to this
amendment to express his disappointment at the timidity of the amendments in
only adding discovery conferences as a discovery-containment device. Lewis F.
Powell, Jr., Dissent from the Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
85 F.R.D. 521 (1980).
4 FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (Advisory Committee's Note 1983 amendment).
5 FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) (second paragraph added in 1983).
6 FED. R. Civ. P. 16(c).
1156 [Vol. 59:1155
WHILE YOU WATCH IT DISINTEGRATE
administration of justice. Chief Justice Burger used the occa-
sion to attack the "handful of members of any profession [who]
can inflict harm out of proportion to their number, on both the
public and on the image of their profession."7 The Chief Jus-
tice followed with the time-honored and virtually always-true
accusations of unjust delays and excessive costs in civil litiga-
tion, and urged flexible and informal neighborhood tribunals,
greater utilization of arbitration and correction of "abuses of
the pretrial processes in civil cases."'
At the same Conference, former United States District
Judge Simon H. Rifkind complained of the "backbreaking bur-
den which the courts are carrying" because of "the litigious
character of our citizenry." He queried whether the courts
should continue to be "problem-solvers" rather than "dispute-
resolvers." "Our reflection," it seemed to him, "ought to address
itself to the question whether the tether which holds the
court... is straying into the territory which more appropriate-
ly belongs to the Legislature, the Executive Commission, the
Legislative Committee, or even to the academic self-selected
task force." He questioned what we can do "to keep out the
worthless, the trivial and those litigations which, by a defini-
tion not yet formulated, ought not to be in the courts?"9
Francis R. Kirkham, at the time Chairman of the Anti-
trust Section of the American Bar Association, also complained
at the Pound Conference about the abuses resulting from "no-
tice" pleading and virtually unlimited discovery in some large
cases:
Judges throw up their hands and ask how they can examine a mil-
Warren E. Burger, Agenda for 2000 AD.-A Need for Systematic Anticipation
(keynote address), in THE POUND CONFERENCE: PERSPECTIVES ON JUSTICE IN THE
FUTURE 29, 31 (Leo Levin & Russell Wheeler eds., 1979) [hereinafter THE POUND
CONFERENCE]. This "few bad apples" rhetoric echoed David Dudley Field who
sought change in the mid-nineteenth century, and Thomas Shelton and other Fed-
eral Rule advocates in the early twentieth century. David D. Field, What Shall Be
Done With the Practice of the Courts? (Jan. 1, 1847), in 1 SPEECHES, ARGUMENTS,
AND MISCELLANEOUS PAPERS OF DAVID DUDLEY FIELD 226, 239 (Abram Sprague
ed., 1884); see Simplification of Judicial Procedure: Hearings on S. Res. 522 Before
the Subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary, 63d Cong., 3d Sess. 12 (1915)
(testimony of Thomas Shelton, who argued that uniform Federal Rules would
make it "go out of fashion to be a 'procedural sharp.").
B Burger, supra note 7, at 31-35.
Simon H. Rifkind, Are We Asking Too Much of Our Courts?, in THE POUND
CONFERENCE, supra note 7, at 53, 56, 58, 61 & 63.
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lion documents and say whether they are relevant, and the problem
is all too often solved by simply giving plaintiffs access to all
defendant's files and records, relevant and irrelevant. And thus the
second evil emerges-a massive and unequalled invasion of privacy
and business records."
At the same Conference, Professor Frank Sander urged
participants to consider the "significant characteristics of vari-
ous alternative dispute mechanisms (such as adjudication by
courts, arbitration, mediation, negotiation, and various blends
of these and other devices)." He suggested the possibility of a
multi-doored courthouse, which he called a "Dispute Resolution
Center.""
To be sure, not everyone agreed."2 But there was an un-
mistakable tone at the Conference that the underlying ideology
of liberality of pleading, wide-open discovery and attorney
latitude was no longer feasible. The alleged litigation explosion
would have to be controlled; the few bad lawyers could not be
trusted to control themselves.
The "sea change" also occurred in the courts. Recall the
early cases, such as Charles Clark's Dioguardi3 and the Su-
preme Court's Conley v. Gibson,'4 which had embraced ease of
pleading. But in the 1970s, some courts began requiring quite
precise pleading for certain types of cases. 5 For example,
many federal courts required plaintiffs in cases brought under
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to plead specific facts in their com-
plaints.'6
"0 Francis R. Kirkham, Complex Civil Litigation-Have Good Intentions Gone
Awry, in THE POUND CONFERENCE, supra note 7, at 209, 213, 214 & 217.
" Frank E. A. Sander, Varieties of Dispute Processing, in THE POUND CONFER-
ENCE, supra note 7, at 65, 67 & 84.
1 See, e.g., Laura Nader, Commentary, in THE POUND CONFERENCE, supra note
7, at 114; Leon Higginbotham, Jr., The Priority of Human Rights in Court Reform,
in THE POUND CONFERENCE, supra note 7, at 87.
1 Dioguardi v. Durning, 139 F.2d 774 (2d Cir. 1944).
14 355 U.S. 41 (1957). This case was unanimously reaffirmed in Leatherman v.
Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence and Coordination Unit, 113 S. Ct. 1160
(1993).
15 Richard L. Marcus, The Revival of Fact Pleading Under the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 433, 447-51 (1986). Professor Marcus identifies
securities fraud, civil rights and conspiracy as types of cases in which the courts
have required more specificity in complaints.
16 Phyllis T. Baumann et al., Substance in the Shadow of Procedure: The Inte-
gration of Substantive and Procedural Law in Title VII Cases, 33 B.C. L. REV.
211, 243-52 (1992).
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This sea change took place at the local level as well. In
1988, the Judicial Conference Local Rules Conference counted
over 5000 local rules, of which 412 related to discovery."
Many of those sought to control and limit discovery, and to
reduce discovery disputes. Fifty-two districts had local rules
that required a conference between the parties prior to bring-
ing any discovery motion, and fifty-four had local rules limiting
the number of interrogatories that could be served on each
party.
18
Perhaps the assumption that has taken the greatest beat-
ing is that of uniformity. The most basic attack was made by
Professor Burbank who noted that the Federal Rules were
uniform in name only, because the broad judicial discretion
granted by so many of the rules hid the ad hoc nature of much
judicial action under the rules.'" Professor Burbank also noted
the non-transubstantive nature of some procedures. 0 Stricter
procedural requirements for some types of cases, as well as
different local rules for other cases, also erode the sense and
reality of the uniformity principle. Tracking systems, emerging
in many state courts, have a similar effect.2' As the Federal
Rules were amended more often, and as many states that had
adopted the original federal rules failed to adopt the amend-
ments, the dream of intrastate uniformity--dear to the Confor-
mity Acts and also espoused by the Federal Rule Reform-
ers-was also punctured.
The most recent blow to uniformity, of course, is the one
that has occupied a good deal of attention at this Symposium.
The Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990 (the "Biden Bill") explicit-
ly espoused experimentation, and required each of the ninety-
four federal district courts to adopt its own expense and delay
reduction plan, and then to implement it.2" I would like to
"' Stephen N. Subrin, Federal Rules, Local Rules, and State Rules: Uniformity,
Divergence, and Emerging Procedural Patterns, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1999, 2020,
2023 (1989).
18 Id. at 2024-25.
Stephen R. Burbank, The Costs of Complexity, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1463, 1474
(1986-87) (book review).
20 Id. at 1474-75.
21 Subrin, supra note 17, at 2038-39 n.207.
' Id. at 2006 n.39 (on aspiration of intrastate uniformity), 2036-37 (on failure
to adopt amendments).
28 U.S.C. §§ 471-77 (1992) (requiring development and implementation of
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describe for you the local rules that became effective on Octo-
ber 1, 1992, to implement the Expense and Delay Reduction
Plan for the Federal District of Massachusetts.' I do this both
because I have studied them and because they will vividly
demonstrate the further collapse of the proceduralist's uni-
verse. Because many of the new Massachusetts Federal Local
Rules are similar to the federal rules amendments that became
law in December 1993, this description also provides a basis of
comparison for those changes."
The foundation of the new Massachusetts local rules is a
mandatory scheduling conference to be held in most cases
within ninety days of the appearance of the defendant.26 The
purpose of the conference is to set cut-off dates for the major
procedural events up to trial, as well as to consider other is-
sues such as the potential use of a magistrate to conduct the
trial, various types of "alternative dispute resolution" and early
settlement possibilities. Prior to the conference the plaintiffs
lawyer must present written settlement proposals to all defen-
dants, and the defendant must be prepared to respond to the
proposals at the scheduling conference.28 Also prior to the con-
ference, lawyers for all parties are required to explain to their
clients the potential costs of the litigation under different alter-
native courses, and to "consider the resolution of the litigation
through the use of alternative dispute resolution programs
such as those outlined in" another rule. 9 The lawyers must
file a certification signed by both lawyer and client that they
local expense and delay reduction plans).
24 Amendments to the Local Rules of the United States District Court for the
District of Massachusetts (approved and adopted by the full court on November
18, 1991) ("The effective date of the amendments shall be October 1, 1992."). Id.
at 1.
25 Examples of similar or identical proposed amendments to the Federal Rules:
Compare D. MASS. R. 16.1(B) with FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f) (Proposed Official Draft)
(mandatory pretrial conference); D. MASS. R. 16.1(A) with FED. R. CIV. P. 16 (Pro-
posed Official Draft) (judge sets the scheduling conference); D. MASS. R. 16.1(D)
with FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f) (Proposed Official Draft) (requiring submission of a joint
discovery plan, conforming with Rule 26(b)); D. MASS. R. 26.2 with FED. R. CiV. P.
26(a)(B) (Proposed Official Draft) (requiring mandatory automatic disclosure of "all
documents . . . that are relevant to disputed facts alleged with particularity in the
pleadings"). The proposed amendments became law on December 1, 1993.
26 D. MASS. R. 16.1(A)-(F).
27 Id.
28 D. MASS. R. 16.1(B) & (C).
2 D. MASS. R. 16.1(D)(3)(b).
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have conferred with their clients in conformity with the local
rule mandate."
To prepare for the scheduling conference, lawyers are
obligated to confer with each other in order to prepare an
agenda for the conference as well as a pretrial schedule. They
also must consider whether they will consent to trial by a mag-
istrate judge. The lawyers are required to file a joint statement
with a schedule they have agreed upon, including a joint dis-
covery plan which, among other things, takes into consider-
ation the desirability of phased discovery, with the first wave
limited to the development of information for the realistic
assessment of the case. Following the conference, the judge is
instructed "to enter a scheduling order that will govern the
pretrial phase of the case."3' Unless the judge orders other-
wise, the order must "include specific deadlines or general time
frameworks" for twelve separate events, and "any other proce-
dural matter that the judge determines is appropriate for the
fair and efficient management of the litigation."32
In contrast, the Federal Rules require only a complaint
and an answer. Under the Massachusetts Federal Local Rules,
however, the lawyer now finds that she is told what to discuss
with her client, what to discuss with her opponent, what to
discuss with the judge and to then file a written certification
and a written joint plan-a plaintiffs lawyer must give the
other side a written settlement demand." Moreover, addition-
al rules strongly suggest management conferences and a "final"
pretrial conference, each with their own detailed set of rules.'
The Massachusetts Federal Local Rules also dramatically
change the discovery process. The parties first must consider
voluntary exchanges of information, and the judge is told to
30 D. MASS. R. 16.1(D)(3).
31 D. MASS. R. 16.1(B) & (D)(1)(b).
:2 D. MASS. R. 16.1(F).
D. MASS. R. 16.1(C) ("[ulnless otherwise ordered by the judge").
D. MASS. R. 16.3 (case management conferences); D.MASS.R. 16.5 (final pre-
trial conference). Massachusetts Local Rule 16.1(F), on what should be included in
the scheduling order which the judge "shall enter" after the scheduling conference,
which includes "specific deadlines or general time frameworks for . . . (8) one or
more case management conferences and/or the final pretrial conference; (9) a final
pretrial conference, which shall occur within eighteen months after the filing of
the complaint . . . ." The list is preceded by: "Unless the judge determines other-
wise . . . ." D. MASS. R. 16.1(F).
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consider requiring the plaintiff to file sworn statements itemiz-
ing their damages, names of witness, names of those from
whom they have taken statements and known governmental
investigations. The judges also must consider a similar order
for defendants." The local rules also set limitations on the
numbers of depositions (5), sets of requests for production (2),
and interrogatories (30). 31
And then there are the "mandatory disclosure rules,"
which are similar to the 1993 Federal Rule amendments. Be-
fore any party can initiate discovery, "that party must submit
to the opposing party a description, including the location, of
all documents that are relevant to disputed facts alleged with
particularity in the pleadings.""7 By agreement, the party can
submit copies.3" I have attempted to explain these new local
rules to at least five separate trial departments: toxic torts,
general litigation, business litigation, environmental litigation
and professional practice litigation (e.g., liability of lawyers,
doctors, architects and accountants). The departments disagree
among themselves as to what is required by this rule, and
there are extreme disagreements within each department.
What is a document "relevant to a disputed fact?" And what
documents are required to be produced by defendants' counsel
for druggists, wholesalers or manufacturers when a pharma-
ceutical product has been labeled "unfit" in a complaint?
There are also intriguing new local rules about the addi-
tion of parties. What used to be a simple motion now requires
the lawyer to confer with the opposition, file a certificate about
conferring, serve a motion on the party to be added, serve a
separate document on the party to be added stating the date
on which the motion will be heard and file a certificate of com-
pliance with the new rule. 9 Moreover, "[almendments adding
parties shall be brought as soon as an attorney reasonably can
be expected to have become aware of the identity of the pro-
posed new party."" Put aside the question of how one adds a
D. MASS. R. 26.1(A) & 26.1(B).
D. MASS. R. 26.1(C).
37 D. MASS. R. 26.2(A).
28 Id.
D. MASS. R. 15.1 (service on opposition); D. MASS. R. 7.1(A)(2) (certificate of
motion conference).
40 D. MASS. R. 15.1(A).
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party "as soon as an attorney reasonably can become aware of
the identity of the proposed party," short of having a pre-pro-
grammed word processor attached both to the lawyer's
brainwaves (or to those of a hypothetical reasonable lawyer)
and also by direct cable to the clerk's office. More interesting is
the source of the authority for such a rule under some combi-
nation of the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, the Rules En-
abling Act, Federal Rule 83 and the Erie Doctrine, as explicat-
ed by Hanna v. Plumer.41 Even more interesting to consider
are: (i) whether this rule mandates a violation of the lawyer's
obligations under Rule 11 not to file any paper without reason-
able factual inquiry; (ii) whether this rule standing alone is
enough to scare any plaintiff's lawyer away from federal court;
and (iii) how to give any first-year student an exam in which
she can realistically rely on current federal procedure, unless
you provide her with a complete set of local rules from some
district to accompany the Federal Rules.
At the final pretrial conference the judge must consider
such matters as utilizing testimony given by written narratives
and the extent to which time limits should be set for each
side's evidence.42 The work necessary to prepare the matters
which will be contained in the required pretrial memorandum
(including "a concise summary of the evidence" that will be
offered by each party) is sufficiently rigorous and expensive to
provide strong incentive for settlement.43 And, by the way, the
new local rule amendments start with a sanctions section: non-
compliance with any direction or obligation in the local rules
"may result in dismissal, default, or the imposition of other
sanctions as deemed appropriate by the judicial officer.""
Moreover, even without considering the effect of local
rules, the Federal Rules are almost self-contradictory: the
pleading requirements in Rule 8(a) are highly influenced by
Rule 11," and the wide-open discovery is circumscribed by the
41 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
42 D. MASS. R. 16.5.
4 D. MAss. R. 16.5(D)(1).
"D. MASS. R. 1.3.
Lawyers in Massachusetts report that the judges themselves are applying the
new rules-which are retroactive as to those stages of prior cases which have not
yet transpired-with wildly different amounts of enthusiasm. At least one judge is
said virtually to ignore them.
It is true that amended Rule 11 does not in fact change the pleading re-
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amendments to Rule 26.46 When one adds the local rules, virtu-
ally every major section of the Federal Rules has been influ-
enced or altered. Pleading rules are now influenced by the urge
to be more precise in order to trigger the mandatory disclosure
of documents. There are new discovery rules. New documents
abound. Motion and amendment practice have been changed.
There are potentially several required conferences. And the
congruity of Massachusetts state rules with the Federal Rules
upon which they were patterned has been dramatically re-
duced by the non-adoption of the federal rule amendments of
1980 and 1983, and by tracking rules, adopted by court order
in Massachusetts,47 which influence the flow of litigation in
the Commonwealth considerably more than the procedural
code. And this is just in one state.
But the disintegration of civil procedure runs much deeper
than conflicting assumptions about rules and the confusing
and contradictory nature of the rules themselves. Consider the
relationships of the attorney to her own professional growth, to
the structure of the law firm, to her clients, to opposing attor-
neys and to the judge. Lawyers, after all, still have clients who
pay them for representation. "Zealous advocacy" is still part of
the Canon of Ethics.48 Under the new Massachusetts local
rules-and the new federal rules-the lawyers are supposed to
attempt co-operation throughout the process. They are asked to
share information voluntarily, to make joint plans and to try in
quirements of Rule 8(a). But it would be odd, indeed, if the obligation to conduct
prefiling investigation under Rule 11 did not influence the degree of specificity in
pleading. One way to discourage an opponent from filing a motion for sanctions
under Rule 11 is to file a complaint that is so obviously well-researched on its
face that it would be patently frivolous to file such a motion. But the unanimous
decision in Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence and Coordination
Unit, 113 S. Ct. 1160 (1993), reaffirms the liberal pleading regime of Conley v.
Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957). See also the recent case of Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. v.
Brunswick Assocs. Ltd. Partnership, 113 S. Ct. 1489 (1993), which seems to take a
more relaxed view on the application of procedural rules than the direction taken
by many of the lower courts (application of a bankruptcy rule, but the opinion
calls upon the language and philosophy of the Federal Rules).
" See generally FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b) (providing for restrictions on discovery);
id. (Advisory Committee's Note to 1983 amendment) (amendments were designed
to "minimize redundancy in discovery and encourage attorneys to be sensitive to
the comparative costs of different methods of securing information.").
41 MA. R. SUPER. CT. 30; Superior Court Standing Order 1-88.
48 MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 7 (1991); MASS. SUP.
JUD. CT. R. 3:07.
[Vol. 59:1155
WHILE YOU WATCH IT DISINTEGRATE
good faith to resolve motion questions.
And what is the relationship of the lawyer to the court?
The new local rules cry out distrust from the bench to the bar.
The new Rule 11 already turned judges into the lawyers' ad-
versaries when it required them to sanction lawyers. Even
under the proposed new Rule 11," judge and counsel often
will continue to be at loggerheads. The new Massachusetts
Rules instruct the lawyers what to discuss with their clients,
and at several junctures instructs the judge to foster settle-
ment. The philosophy is no longer attorney latitude, but judi-
cial control.
Another quite significant change is that the new local
rules force litigators into specialization. There is no way one
can learn each new field in time to make the decisions neces-
sary for the initial scheduling conference, yet alone to engage
intelligently in early settlement talk or early decisions about
ADR. Others may debate the extent to which the new local
rules reduce expense. Most lawyers I have talked to say that
the rules have the opposite result. Regardless, one thing is
clear: they require the front-ending of case preparation. If they
work, cases will be prepared earlier and settled or tried earlier.
This means that a firm or single lawyer will have fewer pend-
ing cases, because cases will not be dragged out, and because
lawyers will need to blanket those cases early on. This obvious-
ly alters staffing patterns and fees.
When, as here, old assumptions are dead and new rules
have created a complex and often contradictory mosaic, I think
it is fair to say that the system is disintegrating.
B. The Changing Legal Curriculum
In some ways, it is even more confusing for the law profes-
sor. Not only must she deal with the disintegration we have
already addressed, but the very field itself has, depending how
one views it, either fractionated or materially enlarged. For a
long time there have been courses in federal courts, conflicts of
law, remedies, evidence and trial practice, all of which touch
upon matters of civil procedure. But since I became a law pro-




fessor in 1970, many, if not most, law schools have added
courses in ADR, complex litigation and international procedure
as integral parts of the overall law school civil procedure cur-
riculum. To what extent should the civil procedure teacher at
least anticipate these other topics? Do we want to force every
student to have to take all four courses, and also conflicts,
federal courts, evidence, and remedies in order to have a gen-
eral education in civil litigation sufficient for the lawyer who
does not become a litigator?
That is a minor question compared to the issues raised by
the attacks on legal education from those who feel we do not
teach the basic skills needed to be a lawyer and from those
who point out the exponential growth in insights garnered
from new fields. Almost all of the fundamental lawyering skills
identified in the Report of the ABA Task Force on Law Schools
and the Profession are inherently related to the tasks of a civil
litigator as well as to the student who only wants to under-
stand the doctrine of civil procedure. The skills identified in
the Report are: problem solving, legal analysis and reasoning,
legal research, factual investigation, communication, counsel-
ing, negotiation, litigation and ADR measures, organizing and
management of legal work and recognizing and resolving ethi-
cal issues. Do any of these skills have nothing to do with civil
procedure and its application?"
Consider now the contributions to the field of civil proce-
dure from other disciplines during the time I have taught.
There are superb empirical studies from, to name a few, Marc
Galanter51 and the University of Wisconsin Law School Civil
Litigation Research Project,52 the Federal Judicial Center, the
Institute for Civil Justice of RAND's Domestic Research Divi-
sion and the American Bar Foundation, as well as individual
studies from scholars like Steve Burbank on Rule 11," and
'0 SEC. LEG. ED. AND ADMISSION TO THE BAR, ABA REPORT ON THE TASK
FORCE ON LAW SCHOOLS AND THE PROFESSION: NARROWING THE GAP, 1992, at
135, 138 & 140 (Robert MacCrate ed., 1993); see also Harry T. Edwards, The
Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal Profession, 91 MICH.
L. REV. 34 (1992).
5 See, e.g., Marc Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know
and Don't Know (And Think We Know) About our Allegedly Contentious and Liti-
gious Society, 31 UCLA L. REV. 4 (1983).
52 E.g., David M. Trubek et al., The Costs of Ordinary Litigation, 31 UCLA L.
REv. 73 (1983).
'3 STEPHEN B. BURBANK, THIRD CIRcuIT TASK FORCE ON FEDERAL RULE OF
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from those who have studied issues of jury composition. Just in
the past few years one finds wonderful reviews of our state of
knowledge about tort-adjudication by Michael Saks,5' and
about ADR by Kim Dayton.55
Indeed, I do not know how law professors could honestly
address the amendments to the federal rules without discuss-
ing the almost total lack of empirical data to support any of
the changes. Could one discuss the massive amount of judicial
control based on litigiousness and frivolousness without noting
that the facts probably belie the allegations?6' Could one dis-
cuss case-management without noting that the facts seem to
say that firm trial dates, without continuances, may be the
fastest, least expensive method of delay and expense reduction,
and that trial judges who stick to such firm dates and do not
otherwise try to promote settlements may both effectuate more
trials and more settlements? 7 Can one discuss civil litigation
CRWL PROCEDURE 11, RULE 11 IN TRANSMION: THE REPORT OF THE THIRD CIRUIT
TASK FORCE ON FEDERAL RULE OF CIViM PROCEDURE 11 (1989).
" Michael J. Saks, Do We Really Know Anything About the Behavior of the
Tort Litigation System-And Why Not?, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1147 (1992).
" Kim Dayton, The Myth of Alternative Dispute Resolution in the Federal
Courts, 76 IOWA L. REV. 889 (1991).
" See supra notes 51, 54. Judyth W. Pendell, a Vice President of Aetna, was
at the Symposium at which my paper was delivered. She wrote me, citing a 1990
Harvard Study (Patients, Doctors, and Lauoyers: M3edical Injury, Malpractice Litiga-
tion and Patient Compensation in New York (1990)), an informal poll taken at a
Fall 1992 summit held by the American Board of Trial Advocates, and data from
the Automobile Insurers Bureau of Massachusetts and the Massachusetts Insur-
ance Commissioner which may all suggest more fraudulent and frivolous litigation
than I am aware of. See generally Letter from Judyth W. Pendell, Aetna, to the
Author (June 22, 1993). I have not yet seen the poll or studies. It seems to me
that the Galanter and Saks articles, see supra notes 51 and 54 respectively, are
persuasive in that many allegations of litigiousness in our country have been over-
statements, but perhaps new data will show otherwise. In any event, it is clear
that the enormous increase in case management and judicial control during the
past fifteen years, the amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure during
the 1980s and the proposed amendments which are currently pending before Con-
gress have not been based to a significant degree on serious or comprehensive
empirical studies. Judyth Pendell's letter to me ends as follows: 'The ICJ and
RAND has begun a study of insurance and litigation fraud, which we expect will
add significantly to the available data, which is mostly narrow in scope or based
on estimates by the judiciary and members of the bar." Id.
"See, e.g., Thomas W. Church, Civil Case Delay in State Trial Courts, 4 JUST.
SYS. J. 166 (1978) (summarizing his findings and those of Federal Judicial Center
civil case management study). "Research has not so far confirmed that more judi-
cial intervention produces more settlements." Marc Galanter, The Emergence of the
Judge as a Mediator in Civil Cases, 69 JUDICATURE 257, 262 (1986).
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at all without mentioning the paucity of return for most plain-
tiffs5 8 or that litigants often still receive more than if they did
not litigate? Should not the law professor point out that there
appears to be a paucity of data that truly supports the effi-
ciency claims of ADR advocates?59 How does one deal with the
issue of jury trial, without talking about the known differences
between juries of twelve and six? How do we discuss discovery
and its alleged reform without noting that a very high percent-
age of the cases have minimal amounts of discovery by most
standards?0
Then the conscientious civil procedure instructor must
turn to the literature about the social psychology of procedural
justice. The works of E. Allan Lund, Tom R. Tyler, John
Thibaut and Laurens Walker come to mind.61 It seems to me
that a student studying notice and the right to be heard ought
to know the results of studies about the importance to litigants
58 THE INSTITUTE FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, 1992 ANNUAL REPORT (1992); Trubek et
al., supra note 52, at 110.
5 See supra note 55.
o Trubek et al., supra note 52, at 91, see also PAUL R. CONNOLLY ET AL.,
FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, JUDICIAL CONTROLS AND THE CIVIL LITIGATIVE PRO-
CESS: DISCOVERY 29 (1978). Judyth W. Pendall suggested at the Symposium and in
her letter to me that there is more discovery than I suggest. She sent me two pa-
pers: Susan Keilitz, Roger Hanson & Richard Semiatin, Attorney's Views of the
Civil Discovery Practice in the State Trial Courts and Susan Keilitz, Roger Hanson
& Henry W. K. Daley, Is Civil Discovery in State Trial Courts Out of Control? In
the latter mentioned paper, the authors describe the data from a recent National
Center for State Courts study of five state courts. I believe the data supports my
statement that "a very high percentage of the cases have minimal amounts of
discovery by most standards." For instance, the author's report that there was no
recorded discovery in 42% of the cases, and in 37% of the other cases there were
three or fewer pieces of discovery. They report: "Across the five courts, the level of
discovery activity is lower than proponents of discovery reform might expect to
find" and that the median number of discovery vehicles is four. Id. at 8. They con-
clude: "Perhaps the most salient observation that can be made from the NCSC
study is that for the majority of civil litigation, formal discovery is not out of
control." Id. at 23. I agree and made the same point during an address that I
made at an international conference on equity in which I summarized much of the
empirical data on civil litigation in the United States as of the summer of 1990.
Stephen N. Subrin, The Empirical Challenge to Procedure Based in Equity: How
Can Equity Procedure Be Made More Equitable?, in EQUITY AND CONTEMPORARY
LEGAL DEVELOPMENT 761, 768, 769, 773 & 774 (Stephen Goldstein ed., the Hebrew
University of Jerusalem, 1992).
" See generally E. ALLAN LUND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF
PROCEDURAL JUSTICE 7-10 (1988); JOHN THIBAUT & LAURENS WALKER, PROCEDURAL
JUSTICE: A PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS (1975).
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of telling their own stories and having some control over their
own disputes. And they should also have the counter-evidence
of how rarely these goals are met.62
Then there are jurisprudential strains that have an enor-
mous impact on civil procedure. The move to efficiency which
has driven much civil reform is certainly related to the Law
and Economics movement. I do not know how to talk about the
relationship of law and equity and of the judge and the jury
while ignoring the contributions of James White and others in
the field of law and literature to our thinking about how every
field of expertise confronts the problem of what is left in and
what is left out of the total reality." Can one teach very much
about trial by jury or ADR without considering the many con-
tributions from feminist jurisprudence? How does one talk
about law and equity, or the jury, or summary judgment, while
ignoring differences between linear and contextual thought,
whether or not one uses that vocabulary? How does one talk
about the jury and its composition, or about civil justice gen-
erally, without considering race theory, American history and
gender bias studies?
This moves us to Legal Realism and the Critical Legal
Studies Movement. Most civil procedure books have hundreds
of pages on jury-control issues, whether or not they label them
as such. Is not the Legal Realist and the New Deal infatuation
with the judge who is among "the best and the brightest" rele-
vant to this discussion? How do we talk about the positions of
Charles Clark, Owen Fiss or Jack Weinstein while ignoring the
pervasive judge-fetish which is at least as strong as the alleged
irrational jury-fetish?' There is the even more basic question
of the extent to which rules dictate results, what the "crits"
have called the indeterminacy issue. A student of mine is in
the process of studying whether the procedural rules on plead-
ing are considerably less important to results than the broader
"2 See, e.g., Deborah R. Hensler, Resolving Mass Toxic Torts: Myths and Reali-
ties, 1989 U. ILL. L. REV. 89.
63 JAMES B. WHITE, THE LEGAL IMAGINATION (1973).
' I take the term "jury fetish" from the title of this article: David Shapiro &
Daniel R. Coquillette, The Fetish of Jury Trial in Civil Cases: A Comment on
Rachal v. Hill, 85 HARV. L. REV. 442 (1971). By the way, this is a dispute that
leads back to the empiricism of Kalven and Ziesal. HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS
ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY (1966).
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legal culture. For example, the rules in the state court and
federal courts of Illinois, although dramatically different over
fifty years, may each be interpreted in the Clarkian spirit of
permissiveness in the nineteen-fifties and sixties, but in the
spirit of the Field Code, in the nineteen-eighties and nineties.
Do we ignore these or other insights on indeterminacy?
And consider for a moment the importance of history in
trying to make any sense out of the current ferment in civil
procedure. Usually when proceduralists talk about history it is
in the Maitland sense of writs "ruling us from the grave."65
And many civil procedure books contain information about
writs, single issue pleading and a few of the provisions of the
Field Code.66 But there is a good deal of procedural history
which is far more important. As I mentioned, every procedure
book touches upon the right to trial by jury and the manner by
which the judiciary hedges in that right. It is difficult to assess
the importance of the right itself and judicial control of the
right (such as bifurcated trials and the enlarged role of sum-
mary judgment) without knowing of the history of juries. The
history teaches that the debate is by no means only about
efficiency and alleged predictability; it is about the jury as a
buffer against judicial power and the jury's role in granting the
citizenry political power and educating them about the law and
the importance of obedience to it. It is also about permitting
citizens' stories to be heard and acted upon by their peers.
The differences between the Field Code's emphasis on
facts and causes of action, the Federal Rule's insistent avoid-
ance of those words and the manner in which amended Rule
11 and mandatory disclosure have returned to notions of factu-
al inquiry and "facts alleged with particularity" make little
sense without a knowledge of why various groups have wanted
different procedural regimes. How does one honestly talk about
the Federal Rules (or structural cases under them) without
talking about the New Deal or the Warren Court, and how
does one talk about the backlash against flexible, liberal proce-
dure without talking about the Burger court or the judicial ap-
61 FREDRIC W. MAITLAND, EQUITY, ALSO THE FORMS OF ACTION AT COMMON
LAW 296 (1909).
61 JOHN COUND ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE: CASES AND MATERIALS (1982); RICH-
ARD L. MARCUS ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE: A MODERN APPROACH (1989).
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pointments of Presidents Reagan and Bush? History shows
that the Field Code and the Federal Rules were the result of a
coalescence of liberal, conservative and professional agendas,
as well as the result of procedures that were in fact not work-
ing very well. 7 The expansion and contraction of the utiliza-
tion of the class action rule during the past fifty years makes
little sense devoid of the historical times and events which led
to such changes.
It is not only historical context that is needed to make
sense of the various contradictions and cross-currents that
inhere in procedural rules. In at least some areas, it seems
pretty clear that the type of case being adjudicated has a bear-
ing on how the rules are applied, and this admixture is itself
influenced by the political currents of the times.6" It is not
likely that during the 1960s the pleading requirements for civil
rights cases would have heightened or that current Rule 11
and its chilling effect on civil rights litigants would have been
adopted.
In fact, a major problem in trying to figure out how to
teach civil procedure in the late-twentieth century is that it
seems like so many things are related to so many other things.
It is not so much that empiricism, feminist theory, law and
economics or history are a lens that can inform civil procedure;
civil procedure is part and parcel of these other disciplines as
much as they are a part of it. In a sense, this is the disintegra-
tion of a field not only by fission but also by fusion.
Edmund Wilson argues that Jules Michelet discovered the
central notion of modern history when he gained an insight
from his studies of Giovanni Vico. In August of 1820, Michelet
preached the following
on the occasion of the awarding of school prizes: "Woe be to him who
tries to isolate one department of knowledge from the rest .... All
science is one: language, literature and history, physics, mathemat-
ics and philosophy; subjects which seem the most remote from one
another are in reality connected, or rather they form a single sys-
£7 Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909 (1987) [herein-
after Subrin, Equity]; Stephen N. Subrin, David Dudley Field and the Field Code:
A Historical Analysis of an Earlier Procedural Vision, 6 L. & HIST. REV. 311
(1988).




If my tour through current Civil Procedure is at all accu-
rate, then the New Yorker "no comment department" citation
to the Virginian-Pilot map of Europe, Northern Africa and the
Arab nations may be a pretty good metaphor for the plight of
civil procedure today. The old civil procedure maps are not
very good guides. What is in fact labeled a flexible Federal
Rule that still remains may have a less flexible rule sitting
beside it, and an inflexible local rule or a flexible local judge
superimposed on top of it. They all may be operating at the
same time and in strange combinations. If the Supreme Court
of the United States can cut the historic jury in half in defer-
ence to local rules,7" we can surely forgive the cautious or un-
conscious mapmaker who failed to give Cyprus and the West
Bank any names at all. And who knows what to call Bosnia?
II. TEACHING CIVIL PROCEDURE WHILE YOU WATCH IT
DISINTEGRATE
I do not enter into a discussion about how to teach civil
procedure with assurance that I should be listened to. I have
taught from only three major procedure books (plus one accom-
panying problem-book a few times) over twenty-three years.1
I doubt whether one really knows whether a book will work
without trying to teach from it. I have browsed through other
books and read many of the fine book reviews of other proce-
dure books, 2 but I distrust my ability to know what will work
69 EDMUND WILSON, TO THE FINLAND STATION: A STUDY IN THE WRITING AND
ACTING ON HISTORY 6 (1972).
7' Collgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149 (1973).
' I have taught most often from Cound, Friedenthal & Miller, a few times
from Marcus, Redish & Sherman and once from Field, Kaplan & Clermont. I have
on occasion also assigned JOSEPH W. GLANNON, CIVIL PROCEDURE EXAMPLES AND
EXPLANATIONS (1st ed. 1987). I was introduced to procedure by Professor Richard
Field in 1959, using his and former Justice Benjamin Kaplan's pioneering book.
72 See, e.g., Book Reviews of ROBERT M. COVER ET AL., PROCEDURE (1988):
William N. Eskridge, Jr., Mletaprocedure, 98 YALE L.J. 945 (1989) (book review);
Martha L. Fineman, Unmythical Procedure, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 141 (1989) (book
review); Linda S. Mullenix, God, Metaprocedure, and Metarealism at Yale, 87
MICH. L. REV. 1139 (1989) (book review); V. K. Puchinskiy, A Soviet Perspective,
63 S. CAL. L. REV. 155 (1989) (book review); Mark V. Tushnet, Metaprocedure?, 63
S. CAL. L. REV. 161 (1989) (book review). Book reviews of DAVID CRUMP ET AL.,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON CIVIL PROCEDURE (1987); John E. Kennedy, Review, 38
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for me, let alone for others.
In teaching, it seems to me, we largely teach ourselves.
Current books, so far as I can tell without delving deeply into
each, do not fit my fantasy of how procedure can best be
taught. It would not surprise me, though, if each suggestion I
make has been tried by others. Also, methods that I hope may
work for me may well be contrary to what in fact will work
best for other teachers. And just as we differ, so, too, do our
students. Some types of procedure books and methods of
teaching undoubtedly work better for some students than for
others. There may be some approaches, though, which have a
good chance of meeting the needs of many teachers and many
students during this disintegrating period in civil procedure.
Let me offer some that I have been working on.
Even before our field became as chaotic as it now seems to
me, there were problems inherent in the teaching of civil pro-
cedure. Students seem instinctively to understand some things
about their other first-year courses. Courses such as torts and
criminal law are closer than procedure to everyday experience.
Many first year students also seem to expect that law school
will teach them about rules that govern the every-day behavior
of people and the relationship of people to property. For some,
it is an unpleasant surprise that some courses deal with rules
J. LEGAL EDUC. 474 (1988) (book review); Linda S. Mullenix, User Friendly Civil
Procedure: Pragmatic Proceduralism Slouching Away from Process Theory, 56
FORDHAM L. REV. 1023 (1988) (book review). Other relevant book reviews include:
Jeffrey W. Stempel, All Stressed Up But Not Sure Where to Go: Pondering the
Teaching of Adversarialism in Law School, 55 BROOK. L. REV. 165 (1989) (review-
ing STEPHEN LANDSMAN, REAINGS ON ADVERSARIAL JUSTICE: THE AMERICAN AP-
PROACH TO ADJUDICATION (1988)); Book reviews of RICHARD L. MARCUS & EDWARD
F. SHERMAN, COMPLEX LITIGATION: CASES AND MATERIALS ON ADVANCED CIVIL
PROCEDURE (1985): Robert H. Abrams, The New Civil Procedure, 32 WAYNE L.
REV. 1269 (1986); Stephen R. Burbank, The Costs of Complexity, 85 MICH. L. REV.
1463 (1987); Kenneth W. Graham, Jr., The Persistence of Progressive
Proceduralism, 61 TEX. L. REV. 929 (1983) (reviewing JULIUS B. LEVINE, DISCOV-
ERY: A COMPARISON BETWEEN ENGLISH AND AMERICAN CIVIL DISCOVERY LAW WITH
REFORM PROPOSALS (1982)). Other articles relevant to the teaching of procedure
include: Anthony D'Amato, The Decline and Fall of Law Teaching in the Age of
Student Consumerism, 37 J. LEGAL EDUC. 461 (1987); Bryant G. Garth, ADR and
Civil Procedure: A Chapter or an Organizing Theme?, 37 J. LEGAL EDUC. 34
(1987); Linda S. Mullenix, The Influence of History on Procedure: Volumes of Logic,
Scant Pages of History, 50 OHIO ST. L.J. 803 (1989); Elizabeth M. Schneider, Re-
thinking the Teaching of Civil Procedure, 37 J. LEGAL EDUC. 41 (1987); Paul J.
Spiegelman, Civil Procedure and Alternative Dispute Resolution: The Lawyer's Role
and the Opportunity for Change, 37 J. LEGAL EDUC. 26 (1987).
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that govern how lawyers deal with disputes arising in these
other fields. Moreover, the procedural language is often
strange and technical and the appellate cases studied often
first require one to understand the law from entirely different
fields, many of which are not covered during the first year.
International Shoe, 3 for instance, is a case about state taxa-
tion and corporate behavior. Gibbs74 is about labor-organizing,
company shops and violence during labor disputes.
This is all obvious. What may be less obvious is the desir-
ability under these circumstances to share with the student
early on why procedure is important, what it covers, what
values it entails, and why it will not be boring. Perhaps we
should start our courses with explanations and materials
which will substitute for the intuition that the students lack. It
is not self-evident to a first-year student why and how lawyers
take the massiveness of the too many realities of a dispute and
encapsulate them into elements and causes of actions. It is not
self-evident to students that the skillful litigator-and in fact
all lawyers much of the time-are engaged in continued acts of
imagination, on one hand trying to reconstruct what has hap-
pened and, on the other, trying to foresee what may occur in
the future. That lawyers simultaneously try to persuade a
number of different audiences (themselves, clients, opposing
lawyers, opposing parties, insurance adjusters, judges, magis-
trates, mediators, juries) about a number of different things
appears disjointed: difficult and creative, and sometimes ele-
gant or unseemly work. Students should be told early on why
it is both fascinating and important.
Most students will not know in advance that their civil
procedure course will be an introduction to many of the central
themes in our democracy: federalism, separation of powers and
the tensions between flexibility and predictability, discretion
and rule, expertise and lay experience, dignity and efficiency
and the community and the individual. Nor do they expect that
their civil procedure course will expose them to many of the
critical skills of the successful lawyer: thinking, advocacy, fact-
sensitivity, problem-solving, statutory interpretation and
decisionmaking with imperfect knowledge. Maybe we should be
7s International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
7' United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
[VAL. 59:1155
WHILE YOU WATCH IT DISINTEGRATE
more explicit about why the depth and breadth of procedure
excites us.
At the beginning of this talk I borrowed from the corrected
map reprinted in the February 22, 1993, New Yorker in an
attempt to illustrate some problems of chaos. The same New
Yorker may provide a clue about how to teach a field in flux.
The editors asked several contemporary artists to paint their
own renditions of the famous cover which adorned the first
issue of the New Yorker in 1925, and which reappears every
year around Washington's birthday. Art Spiegelman, the artist
and author of Maus I and II, redid the figurehead of the fic-
tional Eustace Tilley in the style of early cubism. The hat has
been deconstructed to show a dunce hat and a falling three-
quarters of the original hat; the head now turns right while
the fragment of the hand and the monocle remains left. The
hand is in several parts. Think of Picasso's early cubism, and
you'll have the picture.
Red Grooms crossed the realism of the thirties'
printmakers with the colors and figurative abstraction of the
expressionists of the fifties and, in so doing, he created his own
new style, merging different, previous methods. Spiegelman's
cubism and Red Grooms's eclecticism both rely on the viewer's
having a firm grasp of the original figurehead. The confusion of
fission in the case of Spiegelman and fusion in the case of
Grooms are relieved by the well-known image that can be still
be discerned in each.
What I learned as a trial lawyer remains true for teaching.
Audiences need logical ways to order and remember what they
hear. They need firm and understandable lines in which to
organize a more confusing reality. I do not know about others
in the audience, but lack of clarity in my own assignments has
often interfered with the clarity of my teaching. Often in class,
I am either trying to do too much or am unclear about what I
am trying to achieve. Even-only occasionally of course-my
class wanders. We read a few cases, talk about them in various
ways, and move on or not as the spirit wills. I did not do that
when I taught high school. Each assignment had a purpose,
even a lesson plan. I told the students precisely what would be
covered, what would happen in class and the types of things I
expected them to learn. This does not mean "spoonfeeding," or
that students are unchallenged. One can be clear about cover-
1993]
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
age and goals, yet leave plenty of room within those con-
straints for rigor, complexity and creativity.
During a sabbatical this past year I decided to try my
hand at creating my own new civil procedure course. I tried
not to look at other texts and, for the most part, adhered to
this resolve. For the first few months, I met weekly with eight
students who had taken my civil procedure course during the
previous semester. For each topic, we kept asking what would
work best for the students we attract to Northeastern and for
me. True enough, sometimes I tried to engage in a reality
check by asking myself and the students whether other teach-
ers and students could learn through the lessons we were cre-
ating. But for the most part, we looked only to ourselves.
I decided to put at the beginning of each assignment three
things: its purpose, what. preparation I expected from the stu-
dents, and precisely what we would do in class. We found that
such clarity enhances rather than diminishes opportunities to
deal with complex matters.
One thing I learned as a trial lawyer is that judges and
juries seem to learn better and remember more through chro-
nological stories. When a witness on direct is led out of chrono-
logical order, it is often confusing. Skillful cross-examiners
frequently pull the stories out of chronological order in order to
rattle witnesses.
The importance of chronology as a way of organizing
knowledge is why I think that casebooks that follow the con-
tours of a litigation are probably not mistaken. Whether one
starts with personal jurisdiction on the grounds that the trial
lawyer cannot even think about pleading before she knows she
has jurisdiction or whether one starts with complaints and
then works her way toward the other stages, the chronology
aids understanding. There are probably plausible reasons for
organizing a procedure course around major themes, relation-
ships, or interactions. But my mind does not remember things
that way, and I think my students may have difficulty with
such an abstract organization. Then again, I like knowing the
concreteness of the initial New Yorker cover, before going to
the Red Grooms and Art Spiegelman.
Many casebooks also give an early map of the whole litiga-
tion path so that the students can fit in the pieces as they go
[Vol. 59:1155
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along. The famous Field and Kaplan75 effort in that direction
made sense. Perhaps it is confusing, though, if the introduction
consumes a significant portion of the whole, and if the student
is never sure what has been covered for good and what wasjust a smattering to be returned to with greater compulsive-
ness in the future.
We are fortunate in Civil Procedure to have a leit-motif, or
idde fixe, that runs through much of the discipline, whether at
the time of writs, the Field Code, the Federal Rules or the new
emerging world. No matter how we describe it, most civil liti-
gation examines events and determines if they add up to be-
lieved facts which fit within the elements of a cause of action. I
have written about how Clark and his cohorts eschewed the
terms facts and cause of action.76 But that is the reality within
which litigators have to work. Even in Dioguardi,77 Clark had
to think in terms of what facts the immigrant importer had
and what causes of action they supported. Many of the individ-
ual pieces of the litigation process-pleading, 12(b)(6), discov-
ery, burdens of production and persuasion, relevancy issues,
summary judgment, directed verdict, jury instructions, opening
and closing arguments, one's sense of various methods of
ADR-require a mastery of the concept of causes of action and
their elements.
Personal jurisdiction frequently turns on an analysis of
where the cause of action arose or the nexus of the claim with
the forum state. Federal jurisdiction requires the action to
arise from federal law. Pendant jurisdiction, even under the
name "supplemental,"' requires one to analyze state and fed-
eral causes of action in order to see the overlap of facts, evi-
dence or transaction. Preclusion law looks to the breadth of a
cause of action or to a claim that may include several causes of
action.
It has become increasingly important to concentrate on
causes of action and their elements as a result of amended
Rule 11, mandatory disclosure of documents related to disput-
ed facts alleged with particularity, case management attempts
71 RIcHARD H. FIELD & BENJAMIN KAPLAN, MATERIALS FOR A BASIC COURSE IN
CIVIL PROCEDURE (1953).
71 Subrin, Equity, supra note 67, at 976.
7 Dioguardi v. Durning, 139 F.2d 774 (2d Cir. 1944).
78 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (Supp. IV 1993).
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to focus and limit cases and limitations of time for the trial.
Since our field does have this critical unit of measure-
ment-the cause of action with its elements-I think the con-
cept should be explored early on and returned to throughout
the course. It is the original cover of the New Yorker around
which one can deconstruct and merge.
The reality that procedure attempts to confine is the larger
story involved in any dispute. The counterpoint to elements
and causes of action in a procedure course is story-telling, and
the tension between confinement and expansiveness. There are
a series of events-a much broader reality-that the legal
system tries to constrict by focusing on a specific set of facts
fitting into elements, which permit the state, through its
courts, to intervene. If one looked only at elements without a
story-line of what happened, it would be almost impossible to
talk about overall fairness, a sense of proportion or the rela-
tionship of what happened to society at large.
In fact, litigators-and especially trial lawyers-constantly
think both about the story (what it looks like, what seems fair)
and whether it permits recovery or other judicial intervention.
Many casebooks, regrettably in my view, fail to include full
stories.
Appellate cases, the major ingredient of most casebooks,
are already the end of the story, a story made stylized by the
constraints of judicial-opinion writing. The appellate opinions
reprinted in casebooks are usually severely edited, leaving out
critical facts about the underlying events and the procedural
choices made by lawyers and their clients. The casebooks often
tell so many fragmented stories that the learner has shards
rather than jugs to contain the knowledge she is accumulating.
A notable exception to the dearth of story-line is the treat-
ment of personal jurisdiction. I believe those chapters are suc-
cessful because they give an historical picture of the develop-
ment of personal jurisdiction from Pennoyer v. Neff' to Inter-
national Shoe,"0 and then to cases such as World-Wide Volks-
79 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
80 International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 316 U.S. 310 (1945).
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wagen,s1  Burger King, 2 Asahi,3  Shaffer v. Heitner 4 and
Burnham.5 These appellate cases seem to work quite well to
convey doctrine and its evolution."6
Casebooks do not integrate viewpoints on proce-
dure-empirical data, jurisprudential writings or even histo-
ry-with the stories that are told. In fact, much of the serious
contextual matter in procedure is provided in separate
books." The not-so-hidden message to students is that these
matters are an add-on, not critical to the essence on which the
student will be tested. Problem-solving books are also deficient
because they tend to deal with stick-figures."8 One does not
8 World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 244 U.S. 286 (1980).
s Burger King v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985).
Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court of California, 480 U.S. 102 (1987).
s 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
Burnham v. Superior Court of California, 495 U.S. 609 (1990).
Perhaps civil procedure teachers are often frustrated about teaching the
pleading, pretrial, and trial aspect of civil procedure because there are very few
landmark cases, and the appellate case law does a poor job in conveying the bulk
of what is important to attorneys and their clients. Did not civil procedure teach-
ers give a sigh of relief when the summary judgment trilogy finally provided some
major case-doctrine around which to teach another procedure topic in the tradi-
tional appellate case-method? See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986);
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co.
v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
See, e.g., ROBERT M. COVER & OWEN M. FISS, THE STRUCTURE OF PROCE-
DURE (1979); ANTHONY A. D'AMATO & ARTHUR J. JACOBSON, JUSTICE AND THE
LEGAL SYSTEM (1992); GEOFFREY C. HAZZARD & JAN VETrER, PERSPECTIVES ON
CIVIL PROCEDURE (1987); STEPHEN LANDSMAN, READINGS ON ADVERSARIAL JUSTICE:
THE AMERICAN APPROACH TO ADJUDICATION (1988). Many civil procedure teachers
have accompanied their course with a book that describes an entire litigation. I
have assigned GERALD M. STERN, THE BUFFALO CREEK DISASTER (1976) a few
times in my civil procedure course, and I assign PETER H. SCHUCK, AGENT OR-
ANGE ON TRIAL (1987) in my complex litigation course. Many procedure teachers
give their students the materials from actual cases. These include Professors Mel
Zarr at the University of Maine Law School, Phil Schrag at Georgetown University
Law Center, and Liz Schneider at Brooklyn Law School. See Elizabeth Schneider
& Kathleen O'Neill, Simulation Materials for Civil Procedure: The Cases of Ellen
Warren and Marian Fleming (1987). At my law school, we have a separate Legal
Practice course which uses the simulation of one or more cases a year in order to
teach beginning lawyering skills.
" On occasion, I have assigned the first edition of JOSEPH W. GLANNON, CIVIL
PROCEDURE EXAMPLES AND EXPLANATIONS (2d ed. 1992) to my civil procedure
class. I liked the book, as did my students, but I concluded that it gave them a
false sense that civil procedure contained more "black letter" law than I believe to
be true. For my taste, it fed the students' deep taste for "answers," which was at
cross-purposes with my desire to force them to ask questions and to learn to live
with the uncertainty which pervades the lawyers' professional life.
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know enough about the problem or the cases to have a serious
discussion about the procedural complexity. Even when
pleadings or other documents are provided in casebooks, the
student is infrequently asked to stand in the position of a law-
yer who must make decisions, draft documents and argue the
case at various stages.
In my view, we need methods to tell procedural stories in
deeper and more thorough ways. :We need methods to permit
the student, like the lawyer in action, to bring her perspec-
tives, values, knowledge, intellect and skills to bear. There are
a number of reasons why I think this integration is so impor-
tant. First, students will feel less alienated from technical
material if they must use that material to solve problems that
appear important to them and that are related to human be-
ings to whom they can relate. Second, students have majored
in a number of different disciplines and have a good deal of
prior experience in jobs, politics, relationships, philanthropies
and hobbies. Contextualized stories that permit them to draw
on their prior intellectual and life experiences will make law
seem more real and accessible to them and help them more
readily to integrate legal knowledge and skills into what they
know already.
Perhaps the insights of other disciplines on law will help
students begin to see themselves as something other than
doctrine-memorizers or technocrats. We need to help embryonic
lawyers begin to form a view of themselves as lawyers that
provides even a small measure of protection from the boredom,
disenchantment and malaise that have driven so many from
the profession. Successful lawyers do not look at legal doctrine
on the one hand, and their skills, values, emotions and policy-
insights on the other as separate compartments. They under-
stand law and their relationship to it in a more organic man-
ner. We should aid rather than hinder such integration. As'I
suggested earlier, much of contemporary civil procedure can be
understood only superficially unless we contextualize and en-
rich the doctrine.
Here are some possible ways of conveying more complete
procedural stories. We could return to longer, less-edited cases,
even though this means fewer of them. We could also use more
trial court opinions in order to demonstrate the more typical
judicial interventions. The highly edited appellate case, fol-
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lowed by fragments of other cases and questions that neither
the author nor the student can usually answer-with cites to
scholarly articles or other cases-strikes me as bad education.
This method engenders guilt because the student does not
have the time to pursue many of the squibs on her own. It also
engenders a "what the hell attitude; there is so much here I
can't learn it all anyway, so I will only scratch the surface."
The fragments are superficial. Lawyers use treatises and di-
gests to narrow their focus, and then turn to full texts.
It is a mistake to insist that fact-consciousness is impor-
tant and not provide facts. It seems to me that many case-
books doubly fail in this respect: they have too little of a major
case, a major article or a major issue in legislative history to
enable a student to follow the whole story or the whole argu-
ment in an intelligent way. They have too many one-paragraph
squibs and one-sentence ideas for most human minds to ab-
sorb. In short, they are superficial in both their longer and
their shorter pieces."
Since we are in a disintegrating stage of civil procedure, I
think it is even more imperative than usual that we provide a
good deal of historical information. By this I do not mean
merely saying what a writ is, or that the drafters of the Feder-
al Rules believed in uniformity. The students should be educat-
ed on who wanted what types of procedures and why. By see-
ing the political and professional agendas that resulted in the
Field Code and the Federal Rules, they can begin to make
sense out of who is pushing what reforms now and why. In-
deed, they can decide on their own the ways in which my em-
phasis on the cause of action, the jury and the roles of lawyers,
and on the pretrial and trial level of activity as opposed to the
appellate-level, is itself value-laden. History can also provide
students with a sense of human limitation, and of the inexora-
ble tensions between predictability and discretion, law and
equity, and between lawyer, judge and jury. Moreover, law
schools are part of the university; the lawyer and the law are
part of greater society. A sense of history should both help to
" Perhaps we should mention fewer articles, but print longer excerpts of those
which we do. We complain that many of our students do not make good, step-by-
step coherent arguments. How often do they read or hear a full-blown argument
that integrates facts, doctrine, values and insights from other disciplines?
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explain the materials and provide one with context in which to
survey her condition and the condition of her clients.
And one can provide history in a number of ways. One can
include narrative history about the development of civil proce-
dure. One can include original documents by the protagonists
and legislative materials-not snippets, but full reports and
full speeches. One can force the reading of advisory committee
notes. One can provide background about the characters in
•cases and about what was going on at the time. Indeed, two
students of mine-a former journalist and a former union-orga-
nizer-have helped me write background stories on Joint Anti-
Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath," Adickes,9' United
Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs92 and the First Circuit case
of Manego v. Orleans Board of Trade."3 And, of course, schol-
ars have already provided background on such cases as
Pennoyer,94  Erie," Hansberry v. Lee96  and World-Wide
Volkswagen.97
Finally, one can see history unfold the way lawyers see
history unfold, in the context of having to make decisions
about their actual cases. I have decided to run two cases
throughout the procedure course next year. These are not add-
ons. They will be as integral to the course as the legislative
hearings, the opinions, the articles, the speeches and the em-
pirical data which I also will assign. I am using a case of a
jeep that rolled over allegedly as a result of the installation of
an elevation kit and monster tires, plus the lift provided
by-no kidding-four hockey pucks above each tire; tragically,
the driver's best friend was killed. The students will also par-
ticipate in several stages of a class action brought to force the
- 341 U.S. 123 (1951). This is the first case my students read in my course
this year. I chose it because the facts are so interesting, because it deals with im-
portant political events through the technical procedural step of a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion and, most importantly, because it contains elegant writing in several opin-
ions about underlying procedural values which I cherish.
9 Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970).
92 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
's 773 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1985).
W endy Collins Perdue, Sin, Scandal, and Substantive Due Process: Personal
Jurisdiction and Pennoyer Reconsidered, 62 WASH. L. REV. 479 (1987).
Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
'9 Allen R. Kamp, The History Behind Hansberry v. Lee, 20 U.C. DAvis L.
REv. 481 (1987).
" World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 244 U.S. 286 (1980).
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City of Cleveland to hire women in their fire department. Both
are real cases for which I was provided complete documenta-
tion from commencement through trial (including pleadings,
amendments, 12(b)(6) motions, discovery documents, summary
judgment motions, trial transcripts, directed verdict motions,
instructions and openings and closings). Between them, these
cases have intriguing and complex issues relating to multiple
parties and theories, Rule 19 joinder, cross-actions, motions to
dismiss, discovery, summary judgment, instructions, directed
verdict, bifurcation, preliminary and final injunction and mon-
etary damages, as well as issues of jurisdiction, venue, and
preclusion.
There are many reasons for running two full cases
throughout the course. They provide giant, chronological set-
pieces around which the students can organize and remember
their learning. They permit a realistic and sophisticated explo-
ration of procedural doctrine and procedural decisionmaking.
They permit the students to see the relationship between deci-
sions made early on to later stages of the litigation. They vivid-
ly demonstrate the importance of facts and how one arranges
them. They permit multiple opportunities to tell the same
story different ways to different audiences. They permit expo-
sure to more types of skills than are typical in first-year cours-
es. They permit the student to contrast and compare two very
different types of civil litigation. They also provide the stu-
dents with a good deal of substantive law in the two cases, so
that they can realistically see the interplay of substance and
process.
I am not using these cases only because I want to provide
occasions to meet the needs of students with a variety of learn-
ing styles, or for skill-development in the clinical sense, al-
though I believe these are both important goals that are en-
hanced by this method. I do not think our students understand
procedural concepts until they can apply them. I think I need
these cases in order better to teach the substantive law of
procedure. Much of current procedural doctrine involves bal-
ancing tests and the invocation of judicial discretion." One
" Consider how much of civil procedure involves open-textured rules, blurred
lines and weighing variables. Some examples are the meaning of the word "claim,"
the minimal requirements for a complaint, the meaning of the word "transaction,"
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cannot learn such doctrine in the traditional sense of knowing
black-letter law. Through the use of highly-textured simula-
tions, though, one can teach students how to make arguments
using such amorphous doctrines. One can also show how law-
yers attempt to make rational decisions in a world of blurred
legal lines, incomplete factual data and a hodge-podge of vari-
ables.
The normative issues of procedure make more sense and
have more meaning when one has to think about them in the
context of fleshed-out facts. I want the students to think about
the relationships between judge and jury after they have
learned about the firefighters case. I want them to think about
Rule 11 and its impact on the bringing or not bringing cases
with respect to an actual complaint that they know intimately.
I want them to think about court bias and about the insights
of feminist jurisprudence in the context of the richly textured
cases about which they know a great deal.
I teach at a law school in which students are required to
have four three-month work experiences before they graduate.
Consequently, we may have a student-body that has chosen us
because they learn better by doing. But I suspect that most
people learn more about doctrine, policy and lawyering as a
result of having to do concrete chores which force that preci-
sion which is the hallmark of superb lawyering. Since civil
procedure is so tied to advocacy, strategic planning and mak-
ing choices, I think requiring students to make full arguments
and to exercise judgment is vital. Well over half of the assign-
ments that I have prepared for my civil procedure class this
year require the students to do something other than discuss-
ing appellate opinions. Often, they will engage in lawyer-strat-
egy sessions. At other times, they will advise a Senator on a
procedural bill. During some classes, the students will defend
common questions of law or fact, "interest relating to the subject of an action," "as
a practical manner impair or impede the person's ability to protect that interest,"
the meaning of "citizenship" or "domicile," sufficient contact with the forum state,
the gestalt-like test in Asahi, "arising out of' federal law, Rule 23 "commonality"
and "typicality" and "predominate over any questions affecting only individual
members." One can memorize the words or tests, but the action that counts is at
the level of application in concrete situations in which "the facts" rarely stand
still. The lawyer's task is to make winning--or at least sensible-arguments utiliz-
ing the doctrine, facts and policies in an integrated way.
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or oppose proposed amendments to the Federal Rules. At oth-
ers, they will argue 12(b)(6) motions, impanel a jury or help a
judge decide a summary judgment motion. I will usually take
the role of a senior partner, a judge or a legislator.
The written materials help prepare the students for the
assignments in class. In more than half the classes, every
student must be prepared to carry out some role, although
perhaps only six or eight will be called upon at random. On
one occasion, they must decide whether they will agree to any
of the ADR alternatives suggested by the judge. I am giving
them an embarrassing amount of data from which to conclude
that formal litigation is itself highly problematic. And on three
occasions, I will require short papers.
Most casebooks do not explicitly discuss the materials
available to the researcher in the library. This is a mistake.
Course readings should describe different sections of the typi-
cal law library and different research techniques in our field.
So far as I can tell, research methods are by no means trans-
substantive. Tax lawyers, business lawyers and trial lawyers
do different types of legal research. In fact, environmental,
labor and tort litigators do different types of research. One of
my writing assignments requires the students to describe how
they have tried to locate certain relevant cases.
Recently I returned to my old law firm to help my former
partners with an internal continuing legal education program.
I had dinner with the head of one of the trial departments and
asked him what type of programs he wanted. He said that the
young lawyers do not think very well. In his view, they do not
force themselves to ask hard questions and then try to answer
them on their own. Frequently, they do things by rote or be-
cause someone told them this is the way it should be done. He
added that this includes quite successful law students from the
elite law schools.
Although older lawyers may always feel that the younger
do not think rigorously, maybe the criticism has more bite
today. I have the sense that a good deal of law teaching in
many courses, not just Civil Procedure, is being done through
lecturing, or through an ersatz Socratic method in which ques-
tions are asked not to provoke deep thought and analysis but
in order to have the student answer what the teacher had in
mind. One reason for this may be the eternal demon "cover-
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age." Particularly during a period of such disarray in Civil
Procedure the instructor may feel that she cannot convey gen-
eral principles that have much meaning through the normal
case method for there are so many contradictions, exceptions,
accretions and variables. In order to convey large amounts of
information more quickly, perhaps we turn to lecturing more
often than we would like to admit. But with the law changing
so rapidly it may be more important than ever that we find
ways to encourage the depth and mastery of basic concepts. It
is a sense of the meaning of excellence that we are trying to
convey and a sense of what it means to think. Many law firms,
so tied as they are to high overhead and billable hours, will not
find the time to teach lawyering skills, that is to say, "think-
ing."
The major reason I want our students hearing full stories
and handling them like lawyers is that I want to force them to
think in front of me. Teasing a principle or two out of an edit-
ed case is thinking, but not enough of it. Having a value-laden
discussion in class without the history, empirical data or juris-
prudence to think about the questions tends to lead to cocktail
talk. I know of no better way to instill in students the sense of
the importance of procedural values-human dignity, predict-
ability, efficiency, community, autonomy-than to provide
readings that explore these concepts, and situations in which
the students are forced to act in ways that enhance or detract
from the values, and to explain their choices.
Perhaps the materials for a civil procedure course should
lay out the doctrine that is not readily conveyed or understood
through a few judicial opinions. This would leave the time to
use the doctrine in concrete situations. Why do students buy
hornbooks and outlines? If the law can be laid out more sim-
ply, maybe we should do it, but only if that then frees the time
for the more complex. I want the students to use the contex-
tual materials in a way that brings them directly to bear on
the doctrine and on practice. I want to see if we can put the
students in situations where they have to think without the
excuse that they are covering so much so fast that they have
no time to think.
I have lost sleep over two major fears about my course for
next year. First, will there be unbearably long periods of si-
lence in the classroom? The assignments are structured so that
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if the students do not carry the ball nothing will happen. My
experience with assignments that carefully define questions
and roles for students is that students usually take them quite
seriously.99 In any event, I am steeling myself to outlast the
moments of silence, and counting on the fact that first-year
students, particularly in the fall when I am teaching them,
tend to do what they are told.
Second, I am trying to teach a good deal of doctrine by
requiring the students to use that doctrine in richly textured
simulations, while simultaneously interweaving contextual
matters. Will this increase rather than diminish anxiety and
chaos, and interfere with learning? If I am correct about the
positive aspects of more complete stories and integrated learn-
ing situations, then procedure taught this way should be more
interesting and make more sense to some students who do not
connect with more traditional methods. It is unlikely that the
type of student who has had little trouble learning procedure
in traditional courses will be less challenged and learn less
when more complex situations are offered and more realistic
and complete questions are probed. I hope I am creating a
giant sandbox for students that will encourage each type of
student to play as hard and creatively as she can.'0 0 I have
tried to reduce the potential for added confusion through the
many methods of providing firm lines and clarity that I de-
scribed previously.
Finally, I would like to address a few mundane questions,
and one more lofty one. On the practical side, how will I in-
clude longer cases, the materials from two real cases and the
longer contextual materials all in one course? I am not done
yet, but it looks like it will take about 2000 pages of materials,
using letter-size pages, double-spaced. I will have about sixty-
three assignments, with an average of thirty pages per assign-
ment. The students will also need a rule and statute book, but
I do not think they will need a hornbook or commercial outline.
By laying out some of the doctrinal material and by returning
' I have used simulations to teach civil procedure, complex litigation, evidence
and an advanced course called "civil advocacy." The latter experience was de-
scribed in JUDITH OLANS BROWN ET AL., A.B.A. SECT. LEG. EDUC. AND ADMISS. TO
THE BAR, THERE ARE NOT GOOD ADVOCATES IN CUBBYHOLES (1975).




frequently to the same two simulated cases, pages are saved.
Also, four of the sixty-three assignments are review quizzes to
be discussed in class. These assignments use very few pages.
There is also the issue of evaluating students since so
much of the course has students performing on a daily basis. I
intend to keep a file on each of my eighty students. I will peri-
odically jot down what I recall of their performances. Since my
mind is a sieve, I will also ask them occasionally to write down
briefly what they have done in class for inclusion in their file,
which will also contain their written assignments. 1
I am unsure whether the type of course I have described in
any way fills the void identified by Geoffrey Hazard"°2 and
others for an overall theory of procedure. But let me make the
case that such a course at least provides a useful framework in
which to think about many of procedure's more vexing prob-
lems. I believe the tension between the story and its legal
elements is central to the discipline of civil procedure. It helps
us understand differences and similarities between law and
equity, judges and juries, formal litigation and ADR. The ways
in which stories, legal elements and procedural rules are en-
twined help us understand differences between good and bad
advocacy. By concentrating on fuller stories and their ele-
ments, and on a variety of relevant audiences, we are provid-
ing multiple opportunities to speak to the relative places in our
procedural universe of community, the individual, law-applica-
tion, dispute-resolution, predictability, discretion, dignity and
efficiency.
Concentrating on formal causes of action enveloped in
fuller stories captures much of the professional life of most
civil litigators. It also exposes students to the excruciating
tension in human existence: how can one impose discipline on
reality in order to talk about it and deal with it, while simul-
... Two of the students who helped me develop my new civil procedure materi-
als have agreed to be teaching assistants during the course, so that one of them
will be in the room with me during each assignment. They will be able to help
me keep track of the class participation of students.
At our school we have a Pass/Fail grading system, with written narrative
evaluations for each student in each course rather than grades. I will evaluate
their final examinations blind, and then have student services give me the names.
I will then add comments on their performance throughout the course.
102 GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR., RESEARCH IN CIVIL PROCEDURE (1963).
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taneously knowing that the broader reality overflows the enclo-
sures? Litigators are like historians and novelists; they deal
both with the boundaries necessitated by language and conven-
tion, and with the larger, untidy reality beyond. To paraphrase
Robert Frost's vision of poetry, procedure deals with exquisite
order and exquisite chaos." 3
EPILOGUE
Seven months have passed since I presented the paper
which is printed here. The Civil Procedure course which I
described has now ended, and the students took their exam to-
day. Their assignments covered both the "old" procedural rules
and the new ones, which became law on December 1, 1993, due
to congressional inaction. I was able to reduce the number of
the students' assignments to fifty-seven and the number of
pages to 1560. The course met fifty-seven times, one hour for
each of three sessions per week, and an hour and one-half for a
fourth session each week.
I am considerably more optimistic about the course than
about the new mandatory discovery rules as now constitut-
ed-but that is a topic I will soon address in a subsequent
paper."4 My concern that there would be long moments of
silence in the classroom during my new course proved un-
founded. The classes were almost uniformly lively, and there
were usually a surplus of volunteers on those occasions in
which I did not randomly pick names. Some students com-
plained that the course required considerably more time than
their others, and that many assignments were too long and too
" My thinking about law and civil procedure has been greatly influenced by
JAMES B. WHITE, THE LEGAL IMAGINATION STUDIES IN THE NATURE OF LEGAL
THOUGHT AND EXPRESSION (1973). On a few occasions, I have taught a course
based on this book. Some of my ideas on "order" and "chaos" surely grew out the
experience of teaching that course. I particularly enjoyed his chapter on The Imag-
ination of the Lawyer, with its section on Is the Judge Really a Poet? White prints
excerpts from two Robert Frost essays, The Constant Symbol (Introduction to THE
POEMS OF ROBERT FROST (Modem Library ed. 1946)) and The Figure a Poem
Makes (1949) (SELECTED PROSE OF ROBERT FROST (Cox & Lathem eds. 1967)).
WHITE, supra, at 766-73. I have been unable to find the phrase "exquisite order
and exquisite chaos," but suspect it is not my own.
1C4 I have been asked to present a paper on the new discovery rules at the civil
procedure section of the annual meeting of the Association of American Law
Schools on January 7, 1994.
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demanding. Moreover, they not only had to read the material,
but they had to use it (of course, that was the point!). The
students were almost always well-prepared.
By the end of the course, most of the students sounded
more knowledgeable about, and comfortable with, procedural
issues than in any other civil procedure course I have taught
over the past twenty-three years. Most students seemed to
internalize the doctrine and values in meaningful ways. As
they prepared for their exam, many told me that they found
that they already knew the material.
Although I will know more about results when I read the
exams over the next several weeks, my teaching assistants and
I were extremely pleased with what we witnessed over the
past four and one-half months. After I evaluate the exams, I
will then be able to read the rather detailed evaluations of the
course many students wrote during the last week of class. Five
of the students have agreed to help me improve the materials
and the course for next year's beginning law students.
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